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Comment
Judicial Adoption of Comparative Negligence-
The Supreme Court of California
Takes A Historic Stand
VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ*
Many arguments, some quite sophisticated, have been advanced for
and against the proposition that comparative negligence can and should
be implemented by the judiciary in the absence of legislative action. The
high degree of academic interest that the issue has provoked is probably
based upon the fact that neither courts, practicing lawyers, nor law
professors have "any agreed upon theory on the limits of the powers
of common law courts."'
Arguments against the adoption of comparative negligence by the
judiciary, except for a rather lonely Florida decision,' have met with
almost uniform success in the courts.' Thus, the decision of the Supreme
Court of California in Li v. Yellow Cab Company of California,4 adopt-
ing a pure comparative negligence system in place of the contributory
negligence defense, is a decision of major significance.
The dramatic impact of the Li case is suggested by the fact that
contributory negligence was the law of California from its very be-
ginning as a state.3 It is probable that the Li decision will have a substan-
tial impact on the law of other states as well as on the law of California.
* A.B. 1962, Boston University; LL.B. 1965, Columbia University; Professor of Law,
University of Cincinnati.
This article is derived, in part, from Chapter 21 of Professor Schwartz's treatise on
COmPARA=v NEGLIcENCE, published by The Allen Smith Company in 1974. Professor
Schwartz's treatise was referred to on sixteen separate occasions by the Supreme Court of
California in the case of Li v. Yellow Cab Company of California, the principal decision
discussed in this article.
' Symposium, Comments on Maki v. Frelk-Comparative v. Contributory Negligence:
Should the Court or Legislature Decide?, 21 VAND. L. Rav. 889, 897 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as Comments on Maki v. Frelk]. See also Schwartz, Comparative Negligence: Oiling
the System, 11 TRIAL 58 (1975).
2 Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
3 See, e.g., McGraw v. Corrin, - Del. - , 303 A.2d 641 (1973); Loui v. Oakley,
50 Hawaii 260, 438 P.2d 393 (1968); Maki v. Frelk, 40 Ill. 2d 193, 239 N.E.2d 445 (1968);
Haeg v. Sprague, Warner & Co., 202 Minn. 425, 281 N.W. 261 (1938); Krise v. Gillund,
184 N.W.2d 405 (N. Dak. 1971); Syroid v. Albuquerque Gravel Prod. Co., 86 N.M. 235,
522 P.2d 570 (1974); Peterson v. Culp, 255 Ore. 269, 465 P.2d 876 (1970).
413 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975) (en banc).
5 See Innis v. The Steamer Senator, 1 Cal. 459, 460-61 (1851).
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The extensive and well reasoned opinion of Justice Sullivan may be
expected to provide a basis for similar decisions. This article will dis-
cuss the arguments for and against judicial adoption of comparative
negligence, and then focus on the nature and scope of the Li decision.
THE CASE AGAINST JUDICIAL ADOPTION OF
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
The most telling argument against judicial implementation of
comparative negligence is that the matter is better left to the legislature.
Although contributory negligence had a common law origin, it is argued,
it has been with us so long and is so deeply engrained in the law that
it has become a fundamental part of our jurisprudence and only the
legislature can tamper with it. This argument is bolstered by the con-
tention that legislative inaction, especially outright failure to pass
comparative negligence statutes, evinces a legislative intention to retain
contributory negligence.
This long history lends particular relevance to the principle of
stare decisis. Liability insurance companies may have taken into account
the fact that, in theory, their negligent insureds will not be liable when
they injure persons whose own negligence contributed to the happening
of an accident.
In recent years the judiciary in many states has weeded a number
of anachronistic doctrines out of the law of torts in spite of marginal
reliance on these rules by liability insurance companies. Nevertheless,
it has been suggested by courts that the change from contributory to
comparative negligence involves different considerations because it is
so pervasive-it potentially affects every negligence case.6
A most important distinction between judicial adoption of com-
parative negligence and a number of the other major judge-made changes
of the past two decades is the very difficult problem of formulating an
alternative rule.7 What form of comparative negligence is to be chosen?
Is it to be pure comparative negligence' as in Florida, Mississippi, New
York, Rhode Island, and Washington? Or is it to be modified compara-
tive negligence,9 the approach taken by the overwhelming number of
states with legislation on the subject? If it is to be modified compara-
tive negligence, which type of modified comparative negligence should be
6 See Maki v. Frelk, 40 IUl. 2d 193, 239 N.E.2d 445 (1968).
7 See Krise v. Gillund, 184 N.W.2d 405 (N. Dak. 1971) (explicitly relying on difficulty
in selecting an alternative system in declining to make the change).
8 See text accompanying note 45 infra.
9 See text accompanying note 46 infra.
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selected ?1o Some jurisdictions bar the plaintiff from any recovery if he
is equally as negligent as defendant. Others require abrogation of plain-
tiff's claim only when he is more negligent than defendant.
The choice before the courts involves more than selecting case law
from another jurisdiction. Comparative negligence is usually statutory."
Moreover, courts must do more than reason from a statute.12 They
must adopt an entire statutory system, an act that goes beyond the
traditional bounds of case-law decision. 13
In addition, the decisions which courts must face involve more
than making a selection from the numerous forms of comparative negli-
gence. Once a system is selected, the court will be faced with many diffi-
cult questions in future decisions. For example, should the change be
retroactive? Should the doctrines of last clear chance or assumption
of risk be retained? How are cases involving multiple parties to be
handled? To date, the overwhelming majority of courts have avoided
this abyss and have left the task of reform to the legislature.
THE CASE FOR JUDICIAL ADOPTION OF
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
Arguments in favor of judicial implementation of a comparative
negligence system begin with the fundamental fact that the contributory
negligence defense was created by the courts. It is argued, therefore,
that it can be judicially exercised or modified. Statements similar to
that of the Minnesota Supreme Court that "the rule of contributory
negligence, through no fault of ours, remains in our law"14 are simply
in contravention of documented legal history.
The contributory negligence defense began with Butterfield v.
Forrester"5 and was implemented in this country by judicial decision."
Although the common-law doctrine of stare decisis places a high value
1
oAnother form of modified comparative negligence simply divides damages between
plaintiff and defendant. The rule sacrifices justice in individual cases in order to obtain
procedural convenience. It was applied for many years in admiralty cases involving colli-
sions, but was recently relegated to the area of "historic interest" when it was rejected by
the Supreme Court of the United States in favor of pure comparative negligence. See
United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 95 S. Ct. 1708 (1975).
11 Once a legislature has spoken, courts are reluctant to change to another form. See
Vincent v. Pabst Brewing Co., 47 Wis. 2d 120, 177 N.W.2d 513 (1970).
12 See Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARvARD LEoAL EssAYs 213 (1934);
Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARv. L. Rlv. 4 (1936).
13 See Comments on Maki v. Frelk at 899.
14 Haeg v. Sprague, Warner & Co., 202 Minn. 425, 429, 281 N.W. 261, 263 (1938).
15 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (1809).
16 See Juenger, Brief for Negligence Law Section of the State Bar of Michigan in Sup-
port of Comparative Negligence as Atnicus Curiae, 18 WAYNE L. Rv. 3, 9 (1972), citing
Smith v. Smith, 19 Mass. 662, 2 Pick. 621 (1825).
1976]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
on judicial precedent, courts traditionally have adopted rational alter-
natives when the reasons for a judge-made rule fail.
It is almost universally agreed,' 7 even by courts that have declined
to implement comparative negligence,' 8 that the contributory negligence
defense is outmoded. There is no longer a need to give special protection
to infant industries from suits based on their negligent acts. In light
of the fact that most defendants are insured, the contributory negligence
defense produces a very poor allocation of costs in negligence cases.
In fact, the unjust results worked by the contributory negligence defense
have provided one of the most significant arguments on behalf of those
in favor of a no-fault system for apportioning the costs of automobile 9
and other accidents.
20
Nevertheless, a majority of the members of the Supreme Court of
Illinois have suggested that stare decisis should cause the court to follow
precedent "unless it can be shown that serious detriment is thereby likely
to arise prejudicial to public interest."'" The members of the court were
not convinced that the contributory negligence defense is in fact seriously
prejudicial to public interest.
By way of contrast, Justice Black, speaking for the Supreme Court
of the United States in Pope and Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn," stated that:
The harsh rule of the common law under which contributory
negligence wholly barred an injured person from recovery is com-
pletely incompatible with modern admiralty policy and practice.23
Judge Hallows of Wisconsin has said that "perhaps the doctrine of
contributory negligence has done more to deny justice to the injured
person than any other one legal concept."'24 This is why advocates of
no-fault systems place such reliance on the doctrine in arguing for
abolition of the entire fault system.
The injustice of the contributory negligence defense can manifest
itself in spite of modifications (such as the last clear chance doctrine)
17 See F. HARPER & F. JAMZES, THE LAW OF TORTS 1193-1209 (1956); W. SCHWARTZ &
L. WOLPSTONE, COmPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (A.T.L. Monograph Series, 1970); Prosser, Com-
parative Negligence, 51 MICH. L. REV. 465, 469 (1953). Even the defense bar does not
oppose comparative negligence. See RESPONSIBLE REFORM, AN UPDATE (D.R.I. Monograph
No. 3, 1972) (expressing a preference for the Wisconsin system).
18 See, e.g., Haeg v. Sprague, Warner & Co., 202 Minn. 425, 429-30, 281 N.W. 261,
263 (1938).
19 See R. KEETON & J. O'CoNNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC ViCTI'-A
BLUEPRINT FOR REFOR.IING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 1 (1965).
20 Se.e J. O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY 15-16 (1975).
21 Maki v. Frelk, 40 I1. 2d at 193, 239 N.E.2d at 447.
22346 U.S. 406 (1953).
23 Id. at 408-09.
24 Hallows, Comparative Negligence, 19 FED. INS. COUNSEL Q. 71, 72 (1969).
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that have been utilized to soften its harshness. Thus, in cases where
plaintiff sought to have the court change from contributory to com-
parative negligence, there apparently was no common law "safety de-
vice" by which to allow a seriously injured, negligent plaintiff any re-
covery. -"
Some opponents of comparative negligence have suggested that
the doctrine is an unnecessary frill because juries almost always modify
the contributory negligence defense and apply a de facto comparative
negligence system. 0 This assertion is an overstatement. Serious studies
of the American jury indicate that it frequently respects the judge's
charge and applies the contributory negligence defense to preclude re-
covery. 7 More importantly, we must ask whether we want a system of
justice that depends on a jury ignoring the law.
Despite these considerations, many judges apparently still believe
that they must await legislative action. Legal analysis indicates that
this hesitation is not well founded. Until the legislature does enact a
statute endorsing contributory negligence, the area is open for judicial
decision.
As Professor Robert Keeton has suggested, state courts of last
resort have not failed in the past two decades to rid tort law of out-
moded and unjust common-law rules.2 A number of such changes are
less complex and pervasive than the shift from contributory to com-
parative negligence. Nevertheless, several recent decisions do represent
fundamental changes. For example, the Supreme Court of California
in Rowland v. Christian29 rejected the common-law categories of tres-
passer, licensee, and invitee as the ultimate vehicles for formulating the
duty of a landholder to persons who come on his property. This decision,
as would be the case in a change from contributory to comparative
negligence, creates a problem of fashioning an alternative rule. Neverthe-
less, it has gained growing acceptance by courts.30
25 See Loui v. Oakley, 50 Hawaii 260, 438 P.2d 393 (1968); Maki v. Frelk, 40 InI. 2d
193, 239 N.E.2d 445 (1968); Haeg v. Sprague, Warner & Co., 202 Minn. 425, 281 N.W.
261 (1938); Krise v. Gillund, 184 N.W.2d 405 (N. Dak. 1971).
26See Alibrandi v. Helmsley, 63 Misc. 2d 997, 998, 314 N.Y.S.2d 95, 97 (N.Y. City
Civ. Ct. 1970): "As every trial lawyer knows, the jury would likely have ignored its in-
structions on contributory negligence and applied a standard of comparative negligence"
(judge, acting as the trier of fact, felt compelled to apply the contributory negligence de-
fense); J. UJLMAN, A JuDGE TAYEs THE STAND 30-34 (1933).
2 7 See Comments on Maki v. Frelk at 902-03. See also Alibrandi v. Helmsley, 63 Mlisc. 2d
997, 314 N.Y.S.2d 95 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1970), where a judge acting as trier of fact felt
compelled to apply the defense.
28 See Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HAxv. L. Rzv. 463 (1962)
(collecting more than 90 overruling decisions on more than 30 separate rules of tort law).
29 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
30 See, e.g., Pickard v. City and County of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 134, 452 P.2d 445
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Similarly, many courts have abolished intrafamily immunities,3 1
even though this creates special problems in defining the tort obligations
of family members toward one another.32 In fact, almost every rejection
of a deep-seated common-law rule forces a court to fashion an alternative
approach. 33
It is true that a court adopting comparative negligence may be
using a statute, rather than a case, as the underlying basis for its new
rule. However, there is nothing inherently wrong with this approach,
and it has been used without creating a serious crisis in the area of
contribution among joint tortfeasors."4
A persuasive precedent suggesting that statutes can serve as a
source of law is the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc."5 There, the late Mr. Justice Har-
lan, a man who was particularly sensitive to judicial encroachment on
the legislature's domain, held for a unanimous Court that the judiciary
could create an action for wrongful death under federal maritime law.
In order to do this, the federal courts had to look to legislation to fashion
a remedy. This did not trouble Justice Harlan. He said:
It has always been the duty of the common-law court to perceive
the impact of major legislative innovations and to interweave the
new legislative policies with the inherited body of common-law
principles-many of them deriving from earlier legislative exertions.3,
The variety of wrongful death alternatives is certainly as great
as those in comparative negligence.3 Nevertheless, the Court was not
troubled by problems such as who should be the beneficiaries, or how
damages should be formulated, or how- a statute of limitations should
be founded. The Court said it would not be "without persuasive [statu-
tory] analogy for guidance."3 8 The same approach could be taken by
a court in dealing with the topic of comparative negligence.
(1969), and cases cited in Annot., 32 A.L.R.3d 508 (1970). But see, e.g., Werth & Ashley
Realty Co., 199 N.W.2d 899 (N. Dak. 1972).
31 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895 G & H (Tent. Draft No. 18, 1972).
32 See Cole v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 47 Wis. 2d 629, 177 N.W.2d 866 (1970); Lemmen
v. Servais, 39 Wis. 2d 75, 158 N.W.2d 341 (1968).
33 This same problem occurred when the doctrine of last clear chance was used to
soften the blow of the contributory negligence defense. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAw OF TORTS § 66 (4th ed. 1971).
34 See, e.g., Moyses v. Sparton Asphalt Paving Co., 383 Mich. 314, 334, 174 N.W.2d
797, 806 (1970).
35398 U.S. 375 (1970).
36 Id. at 392.
37 See generally S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH (1966).
38 398 U.S. at 408.
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Besides the California and Florida decisions introducing com-
parative negligence, there is a strong precedent for judicial implementa-
tion of such a system. For over a hundred years the courts of Georgia
have fashioned their own operational comparative negligence system. 9
Although those courts did originally rely on two statutes (one dealing
exclusively with railroads) to fashion their decisions,4" the late Dean
Prosser properly called the original cases a "remarkable tour de force
of construction.
'41
Finally, it should be noted that the federal courts have, through
case-law decisions, fashioned a comparative negligence system in the
area of admiralty law. These courts have been able to implement the
rules by judicial decision, and are unlikely ever to retreat from the
"fairer and more flexible rule which allows such consideration of con-
tributory negligence in mitigation of damages as justice requires. 42
It is true that once a comparative negligence system is adopted
many new and challenging legal problems may arise. The appearance
of these problems does not suggest, however, that implementation of
comparative negligence must await legislative action. In the overwhelm-
ing majority of cases in which the legislature has implemented com-
parative negligence, it has not chosen to resolve these problems.4' The
courts still must resolve these matters on the basis of common law deci-
sion. Since this is the case, the courts should not hesitate to adopt a
comparative negligence system that they believe to be just.
Li v. YELLOW CAB COMPANY
In Li v. Yellow Cab Company,44 the Supreme Court of California
was persuaded by the arguments that favor a court's adoption of com-
parative negligence. In fact, the court had to overcome an obstacle
which would not confront courts in other states45-- Section 1714 of the
Civil Code of California had been construed over many years as.providing
39 See Seagraves v. Abco Mg. Co., 118 Ga. App. 414, 164 S.E.2d 242 (1968) ; Flanders
v. Meath, 27 Ga. 358, 361-62 (1859); Macon & W.R. R. v. Winn, 26 Ga. 250, 254 (1858);
Hilkey, Comparative Negligence in Georgia, 8 GA. B.J. 51 (1945).
4 0 See cases cited in note 39 supra. Currently, the statutes are GA. CODE ANN. §§ 94-703
& 105-603 (Spec. Supp. 1971).
41W. PRoSSER, HANDBOOK o = LAW OF TORTS § 67 (4th ed. 1971).
42 Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409 (1958). See also note 10 supra.
43 See V. SciwARTz, CompARATI NEGLIGENCE, Appendix B, 369-86 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as CoMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE].
44 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
45 See 13 Cal. 3d at 813, 532 P.2d at 1232, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 864. Louisiana is the only
other state that might encounter such a problem, but in that state the Civil Code could be
utilized to support comparative negligence. See Malone, Comparative Negligence, Louisiana's
Forgotten Heritage, 6 LA. L. Rav. 125 (1945).
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for the contributory negligence defense.4 6 This fact gave a degree of
legislative imprimatur to the old common law rule. The court overcame
this obstacle through an extensive study of the history of Civil Code
Section 1714 and concluded that the legislature had not intended to
freeze the rule of contributory negligence into the law. Certainly the
black letter of the provision does not suggest that contributory negli-
gence must be retained. In fact, the provision could be read to sponsor
comparative negligence !
Once the court adopted the thesis that it had the power to convert
to comparative negligence, it then resolved a number of the practical
problems that a judicial adoption of this system might bring about. The
net result was to provide more "answers" to comparative negligence
problems than many legislatures have in the past. 8 The court made
careful use of resource material on comparative negligence in designing
an introductory plan of the doctrine for California.
The court did not attempt to resolve every potential comparative
negligence problem; rather, it dealt with a few of the most important
ones, leaving the rest to the common law decision process. By doing so,
the court struck a practical balance between the need for guidance and
the traditional common law restraint against deciding issues in the
abstract.
Selection of a "Pure" Comparative Negligence System
The Li court, faced with the selection of a form of comparative
negligence, chose a "pure" system. Under a "pure" comparative negli-
gence system, a contributorily negligent plaintiff's damages are reduced
by the trier of fact in proportion to the amount of fault attributable to
him.4 9 The court indicated that it preferred this system over the so-called
"modified" forms because the lattdr simply shift "the lottery aspect of
the contributory negligence rule to a different ground."50 In other words,
the court accepted the underlying basis of comparative negligence-
that damages should be apportioned in accordance with fault. If one
46 Section 1714 provides as follows:
Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an
injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the manage-
ment of his property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want
of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself. The extent of liability in such
cases is defined by the Title on Compensatory Relief.
CA.. CIV. CODE § 1714 (West 1973) (emphasis added).
47 See Bodwell, It's Been Comparative Negligence for Seventy-Nine Years, 27 L.A. BAR
BuLL. 247, 273 (1952). This argument was also made, but was not accepted by the court.
48 See note 43 supra.
49 See COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 3.2.
50 13 Cal. 3d at 827, 532 P.2d at 1242, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 874.
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accepts that premise, there is no reason why plaintiff's claim should be
barred the moment he is "50 percent" or more at fault. 1
Administration of the System
The court also provided some guidance with respect to the admin-
istration of a comparative negligence system. In this regard, the court
suggested that special verdicts or special interrogatories could be em-
ployed by the trial court, and that this procedure would help to assure
judges that the jury was applying the system correctly. An attorney
for either party might draft special interrogatories that would ascertain
the percentage of fault attributable to each party and how much damage
each party suffered.52
Interaction with Other Tort Doctrines
The Li court gave firm guidance with respect to some of the most
important problems of interaction between comparative negligence and
other tort doctrines. In this connection, the court specifically indicated
that the need for last clear chance no longer existed in California, adopt-
ing the view that the retention of last clear chance would only result
"in a windfall to the plaintiff in direct contravention of the principle of
liability in proportion to fault."53 In this respect, the adoption of pure
comparative negligence will assist defendant as he will no longer have
to pay total damages when he has the last clear chance, but may have
them reduced by the amount plaintiff was at fault.
The court also dealt with another legal problem that has perplexed
many comparative negligence jurisdictions-what is the relationship be-
tween the defense of assumption of risk and comparative negligence?
Respecting this, the court concluded:
[T]he adoption of a system of comparative negligence should en-
tail the merger of the defense of assumption of risk into the general
scheme of assessment of liability in proportion to fault in those
particular cases in which the form of assumption of risk involved is
no more than a variant of contributory negligence.54
Thus, where plaintiff has unreasonably assumed a risk (e.g., vol-
untarily entered an automobile with a driver known to be intoxicated),
his conduct will not totally bar his claim; rather, his fault will be taken
51 See CoiARATmIVE NEGLIGENCE § 21.3.
52 See id. at § 17.4.
5313 Cal. 3d at 824, 532 P.2d at 1240, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 872, citing CoARATnz
NEGLIGENCE § 7.2; Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 41 CAL. L. R.Ev. 1, 27 (1953).
5413 Cal. 3d at 825, 532 P.2d at 1241, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 873 (emphasis added).
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into account and utilized to reduce the amount of his recovery. In that
situation, "the form of assumption of risk involved is no more than a
variant of contributory negligence." On the other hand, when plaintiff
has reasonably assumed a risk (e.g., sat in the area of a baseball stadium
that has no protective screening), his conduct will not be considered as
"fault" under a comparative negligence system. Instead, the court will
decide whether the defendant breached a "duty" to plaintiff. In that
connection, a court will determine whether defendant discharged his
duty by providing some protective screening and warning of the risks
involved."
Retroactivity
In light of the massive changes that might be wrought by the
opinion, the court clearly and sharply confined its retroactive effect.
The decision was applied to plaintiff Li "so as to provide incentive in
future cases for parties who may have occasion to raise 'issues involv-
ing renovation of unsound or outmoded legal doctrines.'-56 The new
rule will also govern retrial of any cases currently on appeal if they
are reversed for reasons unconnected with the contributory comparative
negligence defense issue. In general, the new rule will apply in trials
that begin on or after the date that the court's decision becomes final.
Comparative Negligence Issues in the Future
There were a number of other legal issues relating to comparative
negligence which the court mentioned but did not resolve in its opinion.
These will be left for case by case development. The court did cite
sources with regard to these problems that may be of assistance to attor-
neys in determining what the court will do in the future. These mat-
ters include how comparative negligence will affect wilful and wanton
defendants,5" punitive damages,5" and multiple parties. 59
There are other important comparative negligence issues that were
neither mentioned nor resolved by the court. A few examples include
the interaction of comparative negligence with strict liability,60 actions
5 5 See CO-mPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE §§ 9.3-.5.
56 13 Cal. 3d at 830, 532 P.2d at 1244, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 876.
57 13 Cal. 3d at 825-26, 532 P.2d at 1241, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 873, Citing W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 65 (4th ed. 1971) (suggesting no apportionment when
defendant is reckless) and COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 5.4, suggesting that damages be ap-
portioned in all cases involving misconduct which falls short of being intentional.
58 13 Cal. 3d at 826, 532 P.2d at 1241, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 873.
59 13 Cal. 3d at 823, 532 P.2d at 1240, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 782, citing Prosser, Compara-
tive Negligence, 41 CAL. L. REV. 1, 33-37 (1953); COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE §§ 16.1-.9.
60 COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE §§ 12.1-.7.
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based on nuisance,60 and violations of criminal safety statutes.0 2 Al-
though the absence of guidance on these issues will create uncertainty
in the law, a point to remember is that most legislatures have not dealt
with any of these problems, and it took this author over three years of
research to deal with all of them.
CONCLUSION
It seems unlikely that any modern legislature would overturn a
decision of a court that changed from contributory to comparative neg-
ligence. There has been no sign of this in Florida and it seems ex-
traordinarily unlikely in California. Moreover, no state with a statutory
comparative negligence system has ever reverted to the contributory
negligence defense.
In sum, the Li decision demonstrates that the supreme court of a
state can provide an important assist toward making the litigation sys-
tem of adjusting the costs of accidents work. The courts need not rely
on the legislature to rid the law of an archaic common law doctrine.
Trial lawyers should be encouraged to bring the Li ray of California
sunshine to the attention of courts in other states.63
61 Id. at §§11.1-.4.
62 Id. at §§6.1-.3.
0 3 This has already occurred in Alaska. See the recent decision in Kaatz v. Alaska, 540
P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975).
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